Lingnan University

Digital Commons @ Lingnan University
Centre for Public Policy Studies : CPPS Working Centre for Public Policy Studies 公共政策研究中
Paper Series
心
2008

The housing ladder and Hong Kong housing market's boom and
bust cycle
Lok Sang HO
lsho@ln.edu.hk

Wai Chung, Gary WONG
wongwc@ln.edu.hk

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/cppswp
Part of the Economics Commons, and the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration
Commons

Recommended Citation
Ho, L. S., & Wong, W. C. G. (2008). The housing ladder and Hong Kong housing market's boom and bust
cycle (CPPS Working Paper Series No.190). Retrieved from Lingnan University website:
http://commons.ln.edu.hk/cppswp/89/

This Paper Series is brought to you for free and open access by the Centre for Public Policy Studies 公共政策研究
中心 at Digital Commons @ Lingnan University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Centre for Public Policy
Studies : CPPS Working Paper Series by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Lingnan University.

Working Paper Series
Centre for Public Policy Studies
Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences

No. 190 (Apr 08) CPPS

The Housing Ladder and Hong Kong Housing
Market’s Boom and Bust Cycle

Lok Sang Ho and Gary Wai-chung Wong

Lingnan University
Hong Kong

The Housing Ladder and Hong Kong Housing
Market’s Boom and Bust Cycle

Lok Sang Ho and Gary Wai-chung Wong

April 2008

 Lok Sang Ho and Gary Wai-chung Wong
Lok Sang Ho is Professor of Economics and Director of Centre for
Public Policy Studies, Lingnan University, Hong Kong.
Gary Wai-chung Wong is Research Development Officer of Centre
for Public Policy Studies, Lingnan University, Hong Kong.

Centre for Public Policy Studies
Lingnan University
Tuen Mun
Hong Kong
Tel: (852) 2616 7182
Fax: (852) 2591 0690
Email: cpps@LN.edu.hk
http://www.LN.edu.hk/cpps/

CAPS and CPPS Working Papers are circulated to invite discussion
and critical comment. Opinions expressed in them are the author’s
and should not be taken as representing the opinions of the Centres
or Lingnan University. These papers may be freely circulated but
they are not to be quoted without the written permission of the
author. Please address comments and suggestions to the author.

The Housing Ladder and Hong Kong Housing
Market’s Boom and Bust Cycle*
Lok Sang Ho and Gary Wai-chung Wong

Abstract
This paper presents evidence, based on the recent Hong Kong experience,
for the existence of a “housing ladder effect.” An increase of housing equity
at the bottom of the ladder tends to translate into a trading up activity that will
both increase housing market turnover and buoy up the entire housing market.
Based on a natural experiment through the introduction of a public housing
privatization scheme, this papers presents evidence supporting this story using
a logit model and a price-volume causality test.

1. Introduction
Although Hong Kong is well known as a bulwark of free market capitalism,
the government plays a major role in the housing market of Hong Kong. As
Table 1 shows, over 46% of Hong Kong’s households live in “public housing,”
which is a rather misleading term considering that some 36% of this “public
housing” are privately owned. “Public housing” in Hong Kong refers to all
publicly subsidized accommodations. The government also controls the new
supply of land, which used to be put up for auction periodically but since the
Asian Financial Crisis developers have been asked to apply for auction any plot
of land put on the “Application List” announced every year. The government,
through its Planning Department, also directly controls land use types and land
use intensity through zoning regulations. In addition its Building Department
scrutinizes and approves building plans, carries out audit checks on
construction works and issues occupation permits upon completion of new
buildings. Obviously, then, the Hong Kong government has much direct
control of the new housing supply. Moreover, because any purchase of
housing is typically financed through the banking sector, the Hong Kong
Monetary Authority’s “guidelines” about loan ratios, which it expects all local
banks to follow, will have big impact on the demand side. The Hong Kong
Monetary Authority is also instrumental to the setting up of the Hong Kong
*
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Mortgage Corporation in 1997, whose mission is “to enhance the stability of the
banking sector by offering a reliable source of liquidity, to promote wide
homeownership, and to facilitate the growth and development of debt security
and mortgage-backed security in Hong Kong.”
Just as Bardhan et.al.(2003) pointed out about Singapore, private sector
housing in Hong Kong cannot be understood without a good grasp of the role
the public sector plays in the housing market. In this paper, we are particularly
interested in the role public housing plays in the household savings and “trading
up” activities.
Table 1. Households by Types of Accommodation
First Quarter
1995
Total(thousands)
1,755
%
Permanent Public Housing
46.8
- rental Units
36.4
- subsidized for-sale units
10.4
Private Permanent Housing
50.2
Public Temporary Housing
1.1
Private Temporary Housing
1.9

2000
2,014
%
45.9
31.4
14.5
52.4
0.1
1.6

2005
2,265
%
46.3
29.6
16.7
52.4
1.3

Source: Hong Kong Housing Authority

The history of public housing in Hong Kong began with the famous 1953
Shek Kip Mei fire that destroyed the homes of some 50,000 people who lived in
the squatter huts there. Largely as a stop-gap measure, temporary housing was
constructed for them and in the following year the government decided to
construct low-cost rental housing that were then called “resettlement estates.”
The low cost rental housing program was expanded and improved, culminating
in the completion of the Wah Foo Estate in 1971, which was the first public
housing development planned using a “new town” concept. Subsidized
for-sale housing did not begin until 1978. From then on “Home Ownership
Scheme”(HOS) housing as it is called became very popular. Public housing
tenants were given priority to buy these units. HOS housing not only provided
an avenue for these tenants to improve their living conditions but also to vacate
their units to make way for people waiting in the queue for the rental units. As
it happens, HOS housing also provided the Housing Authority with a steady
stream of profits that more than offset the losses for running the rental housing
program.
A major policy change was approved in 1986. In order to make sure that
public resources are used effectively to help the needy, the Housing Authority
began to implement a policy of charging double rents for tenants who had
2

resided in public rental housing for over 10 years and whose incomes had
breached the “subsidy income limit.” The policy was to be implemented in
1987. As it happens, this policy has far-reaching consequences both on the
government’s finances and on the private housing market. The Hong Kong
experience with this policy change, and with still another policy change
announced in December 1997 that effectively overturns this earlier policy,
provides an interesting case study and insight into the working of the housing
market.
In the next Section, we will offer a sketch of the quality continuum of the
Hong Kong housing market, and explain how the policy of charging higher
rents for richer tenants may affect the trading up activities of homeowners.
We will argue that the “housing ladder effects,” which will be defined in that
section, are very much behind the booms and busts of an economy. Two
working hypotheses will be developed, which will then be tested in Section 3
and Section 4. In Section 3, we present a logit model that takes advantage of a
natural experiment resulting from a policy change that allows us to examine
how the propensities of different households to trade up change after home
equity values have changed. Section 4 presents further statistical evidence,
indicating that housing prices generally drive transactions in existing homes,
providing further support to the housing ladder hypothesis. Finally, Section 5
concludes the paper.
2. The Hong Kong Housing Market and the Nature of the Housing Ladder
The Rating and Valuation Department distinguishes five types of housing
from A to E. Category A refers to housing with an area below 40 square
meters. E refers to housing with an area 160 square meters or above. But
private housing in Hong Kong is extremely diverse, from much run-down
premises dating back to pre-war times to very well decorated luxury villas with
gardens and club facilities, and they are located in various locations with a huge
degree of variations in accessibility and desirability. Prices per square foot
could vary from less than 2,000 dollars a square foot to over 20,000 dollars a
square foot.
In Hong Kong although private housing is generally more costly than public
housing, many private housing units are in poor shape, and people often live in
overcrowded conditions with several households sharing one small flat. While
many private housing units continue to deteriorate over the years with little or
no maintenance, there has been an ongoing effort to improve the quality of
public housing. The standard in terms of space per tenant has been rising(See
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Appendix Table 1), and older buildings are demolished with tenants to be
moved in newer, better equipped buildings.
When the Tenant Purchase Scheme(TPS) was announced in December 1997,
the Housing Authority claimed that by providing an opportunity for sitting
tenants to buy their own units cheaply, the TPS provided tenants with the first
step in the home ownership ladder so that they could begin to move up to better
and better quality housing.
However, in fact the first step in the
homeownership ladder for many is actually a place in the heavily subsidized
public rental housing. This has become increasingly evident in the early
1990s. As shown in Table 2a and Table 2b, public housing tenants(PHT)
generally saved more than households in HOS housing, private rental
housing(PRT), and private owner-occupied housing(PRO). The discrepancy
has enlarged tremendously from 1989/90 to 1994/95. The Tables listed the
monthly savings, in dollars, by income brackets. It should be pointed out that
these income brackets refer to the general Hong Kong population.
Table 2a. Mean Monthly Household Savings by Type of Living Quarters by Income Group (1989/90)
Mean Household Savings( HK $, Monthly)
Income Group
PHT
HOS
PRT
PRO
Overall
Bottom 25%

-503

n.a.

-174

-631

-451

25-49%

714

-277

-6

202

425

50-74%

2924

1880

2187

2410

2499

75-89%

6459

3552

5788

4989

5212

16635

15746

17915

14770

15845

Top 10 %

Table 2b. Mean Monthly Household Savings by Type of Living Quarters by Income Group (1994/95)
Mean Household Savings( HK $, Monthly)
Income Group
PHT
HOS
PRT
PRO
Overall
Bottom 25%

-713

-2091

-724

-2773

-1041

25-49%

2059

396

469

439

1221

50-74%

6749

4103

1445

4225

4621

75-89%

15716

11700

10981

12365

12565

Top 10 %
40933
26217
26117
28229
27929
Sources of both Tables 2a and 2b: Household Expenditure Survey 89/90, 94/95, Census and
Statistics Department, reported in Watanabe (1998, Table 6.6)

From the Tables, it is clear that some of the richest households in Hong
Kong continued to live in public housing, and they saved huge amounts of
4

money. The Tables do not show the number of households in each income
bracket, and it will be expected that most probably there were relatively fewer
households in the richest 10% of households who lived in public rental housing
than in private owner-occupied housing. Nevertheless the figures highlight the
validity of the belief that many of the tenants who had been living in public
housing and had been enjoying the subsidized rents no longer needed such
subsidies—this belief evidently was behind the policy of imposing higher rents
on the so-called “rich tenants.”
The homeownership ladder refers to the tendency for homeowners to trade
their existing homes for more expensive, better homes when they have
accumulated sufficient equity in their homes and other savings, and when their
ability to service larger loans has gone up. Ortalo-Magne and Rady(2006)
provided a theoretical framework explaining the working of the homeownership
ladder. For a tenant to become a homeowner, he must accumulate enough
savings to pay the down-payment, which is not only often required but will help
reduce the mortgage payments down the road. This process will be faster if
their rents are lower or if nominal incomes rise faster. An official survey by
the Hong Kong Housing Authority showed that in 1992-1993 as much as 24 per
cent of housing transactions were due to public housing tenants and as much as
13 per cent of public housing tenants owned one or more homes.1 This
provides some evidence that a public rental housing program, by allowing
households to pay low rents, also boosts their savings and hence the ability to
buy a home. Although hard to verify, there is a good likelihood that the
increased interest in buying a home among public housing tenants may be
related to the “public housing subsidy policy” that began to be implemented as
of 1987. If the subsidy is reduced through being charged double rent, the
attractiveness of staying in public housing will be reduced. Since the talk of
the day had been raising the rents for the rich tenants even higher to eliminate
any subsidy, it made sense to get prepared.
Prior to 1998, HOS homeowners would always make a very good profit
when they sell their units, at which point they must repay the Housing Authority
the land cost subsidy implicit in their purchase price. They could sell their
1

“[A]bout 13% of PRH (public rental housing tenants) or 74 000 out of 580 000 households
covered by a survey in July 1993 owned private domestic properties. Another survey on tenants in
North Point Estate showed that 18% of them owned private domestic properties in the urban areas
alone. Some one-third of these households owned more than one property and a small number even
owned up to five properties. An independent exercise revealed that PHT tenants accounted for as
much as 24% of all purchases of private flats by local individuals in the period October 1992 March 1993. The survey results point to the prevalence among PRH tenants in private property
ownership.” (HK Housing Authority, 1994)
5

units in the open market after having lived in their units for over 10 years.
Starting in June 1997, however, there was a new arrangement that is called the
HOS Secondary Market, which is a market with buyers restricted to “Green
Form Applicants,” 2 who are predominantly public rental housing tenants.
HOS owners were allowed to sell from the fourth year after purchase and they
did not need to repay the implicit land cost subsidy to the Housing Authority.3
The fact that such transactions in the “secondary market” in 1997 were at very
high prices (see Table 3) suggest that many public housing tenants were really
cash-rich and that they had indeed played an important part in the very strong
housing market in 1996 and 1997.
Table 3. Actual Transactions of HOS Units in the Secondary Market, Fu Keung Court*
High, Middle, Date of Agreement
Land Premium
Usable floor area
or Low Floor
to Purchase
Price US$,000 Discount Rate (%)
644

Middle

09/1997

506.4

29

644

High

11/1997

461.2

29

645

Middle

04/1998

328.2

29

645
Middle
10/1998
253.8
35
* Fu Keung Court in Wang Tau Hom. An exchange rate of HK$7.8 to 1 US dollar is assumed.
Sellers do not have to pay the land premium discount when they sell in the secondary market that is
restricted to public housing tenants. The buyer will however have to repay the land premium
discount upon resale in the future. The land premium discount is calculated from the formula
(Market Price – Sale Price)/Market Price at the time of original purchase.
Source: Downloaded from Housing Authority website at the time of writing from:
http://www.housingauthority.gov.hk/chi/hd/hos/s_market/index.htm

The policy to deny well-off tenants the benefits of housing subsidies was
further stepped up in June 1996. Tenants paying double rent were required to
declare their assets and would be required to pay market rent if the values of
these assets exceeded specified limits. This policy provided a big incentive
for the well-off tenants to buy in the private market and gave much impetus to
housing prices through 1997.
2

Other “Green Form Applicants” include: Authorized occupants of Interim Housing (IH) of the
HA, Allowance recipients of the HA's Rent Allowance for Elderly Scheme (RAES); Applicants on
the Waiting List, Junior civil servants applying for the HALS under the Civil Service Public
Housing Quota, Clearees and victims affected by clearance and natural disaster respectively, or
Domestic tenants affected by Urban Renewal Authority's redevelopment programme. or Divorcees /
splitting households of the HA estates who are issued with Green Form Certificates.
3
From June 1999, HOS owners can sell after two years from the date of purchase in the secondary
market without repayment of the land premium subsidy. The open market resale date was also
reduced from 10 years to 5 years.
6

Strangely, however, this policy was inadvertently reversed in December
1997, when the Housing Authority announced the Tenants Purchase
Scheme(TPS). Sitting tenants, regardless of whether they were “well-off” or
not, were allowed and encouraged to buy their units at as much as 88% discount
from the estimated market price. Although well-off tenants were later denied
the “discount upon discount” offered other tenants buying within the first year
of announcement that their units were for sale, by allowing the richer tenants to
buy their own units at any discount is still tantamount to giving away the future
subsidies as a gift in a one-off deal. It will reduce the incentives of the richer
tenants to buy in the private market.
From this discussion, we propose two groups of hypotheses that may be
tested. The first is based on the differential effects of the TPS on the
probabilities of different households to buy a private sector home. The
introduction of the TPS is like a natural experiment. The offer of deep
discounts available for sitting tenants to buy their own flats—whose quality has
been steadily improved over the years relative to HOS housing—effectively
lured public housing tenants to stay in public housing even though they can
afford to buy HOS or private housing. We expect therefore that there will be a
marked change in the probabilities of the richer public housing tenants to buy a
home following the announcement of the TPS. The same cannot be said of the
poorer tenants, whose probabilities to buy a private unit had always been low.
Results of an empirical test based on these hypotheses are presented in Section 3.
The second group of hypotheses is based on the effects of housing price
changes on transactions in existing homes, as discussed in Stein(1995).
While Stein’s model is static, the consideration that transactions at the lower
tiers of the housing ladder that are related to price movements will lead to more
transactions “up the ladder” would imply that when housing prices rise, trading
up activities will be transmitted throughout the housing market. Similarly,
when housing prices decline, trading up activities decline that decline in the
first instance will lead to further declines in transactions. We therefore
hypothesize that housing prices will “Granger-cause” transactions in existing
homes. Section 4 will present evidence in Hong Kong.
3. Tests Using A Logit Model
3.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The work reported in this section is based on a survey conducted by the
authors in September 2002 using the facilities of the Survey Research Program
of Lingnan University.
It was a telephone survey using the
7

random-digit-dialing sampling method. The target respondents were heads of
households (HD) aged 25 or above. Table 4 presents the distribution of the
2031 sample households by key characteristics.
These are domestic
households by type of quarters, tenure of accommodation, and monthly
household income. At the sample size of our survey, we more or less
duplicated the distribution by key characteristics in the official data supplied by
the Census & Statistics Department, lending credence to our results. We
should, however, add the caveat that the household income categories are as
reported at the time of the survey, and that there must have been some upward
or downward mobility during the 10 years covered in our study. If there are
no major systematic effects on the upward or downward mobility of households
in different income categories, our results would still stand.
3.2 Variables and the Model
Table 5 presents the list of dummy variables and their definitions. The
dependent variable – Ownership of a Private or an HOS unit - is a qualitative
variable which was coded as 1 if the respondent answered positive to the
question about ownership of a home(other than a TPS unit) acquired either
within the five year window before or within the five year window after
December 31, 1997. The number of observations for the dependent variable is
based on valid responses only (i.e. all missing values were excluded from the
analysis). As a result the sample size for this variable was reduced by 24.
Table 4. Comparison of Sample and Official Statistics
Sample Statistics**
(%)
Domestic Households by Type of Quarters:
Public rental flats
36.3
Government subsidized sale flats
18.9
Private residential flats
44.8
(n=2024)
Domestic Households by Tenure of Accommodation:
Owner-occupier
Sole tenant
Co-tenant
Provided by employer
Domestic Households by Monthly Household Income:
Below $10,000
$10,000 - $25,000
$25,000 or above

8

Official Statistics*
(%)
31.1
17.3
51.7

58.3
40.3
1.2
0.2
(n=2021)

52.9
39.4
2.6
2.5

31.8
40.9
27.3
(n=1659)

28.6
39.4
32.0

*Source: Distribution based on Quarterly Report on General Household Survey, July to September
2002, Census and Statistics Department of HKSAR government and ignores temporary housing.
**Note: Percentages are based on valid responses. Responses “Don't Know” and “Refuse to
Answer” to the question about tenure were excluded from the calculation.

The explanatory variables Age and Income were coded as categorical
variable with three groups. Here we treat “Don't Know” responses and
“Refuse to Respond” as “Not Available” and use a dummy variable (=1) to
capture such responses. “Public Housing Tenant” (PHT) is a dummy variable
which assumes the value of unity for both current and past public housing
tenants. We then created three interactive dummy variables by multiplying the
PHT to the three income dummies (see Table 5.). The coefficients on these
interactive terms would capture the effect of public housing tenancy for any
given income category.
Table 5. Definitions of Qualitative Variables
Variable
Value
Dependent Variable
Ownership of Either Private or HOS Unit

1 = acquisition of a private or HOS flat within the
specified 5 year window, 0 = renter or TPS owner

Independent Variable
Household Income
Less than $10,000
$10,000 - $25,000 (reference group)
$25,000 or above
Not available*

1 = yes, 0 = no
1 = yes, 0 = no
1 = yes, 0 = no
1 = not available, 0 = other income groups

Tenancy in Public Housing (PHT)
Have you ever been a public housing tenant?

1 = yes, 0 = no

Age
25 - 39
40 - 49
50 or above (reference group)
Not available*

1 = yes, 0 = no
1 = yes, 0 = no
1 = yes, 0 = no
1 = not available, 0 = other age groups

Not available, including “don't know” responses and “refusals”, is a dummy variable (=1)

The logistic regression model that we use to estimate the probability of
owning a private or HOS unit takes the following form:
Y i = β 'α i + ε i ------------ (1)
where Yi = 1 denotes homeownership(other than TPS units), α’i is a vector of
observable characteristics (i.e. age, income and residence of public housing) for
the Head of Household i and β is the associated coefficients (including a
9

constant). εi denotes the error term. The estimated logistic regression
coefficients can be used to calculate the probability of i’s being a buyer of a
housing unit in the respective time “windows” before and after the TPS. The
standard equation (Greene, 1993, p.638) is as follows:

e β 'α i
Prob(homeowner i = 1) =
[1 + e β 'α i ]
'

(

(

)

'

)

-------------- (2)

The logit model allows us to determine if the probability of purchasing
private residential flats or HOS housing would be affected by a household’s
having lived in public rental flats or not. In principle there are two effects.
The first is that, since tenancy in public housing is fairly secure and is very
economical, tenants may perceive less need for purchase of a private or HOS
flat(“the substitution effect”). The second is that, since public housing tenants
pay less rent, they receive an extra income in kind and therefore would
accumulate more savings and thus will be in a better position to buy(“the
income effect”). We expect that the latter effect is stronger for the richer
tenants who may perceive their tenure as less secure, and weaker for the less
well-off tenants. We hypothesize, in particular, that richer public housing
tenants had the highest probability to buy a home before TPS and that with TPS
this group’s propensity to buy a home other than TPS would decline.
To determine these effects we introduce three interactive dummies dummies for the low, middle and high income groups multiplied to the PHT
dummy - into our model.4 The coefficients on these interactive terms depict,
for the respective income brackets, the additional effects of tenancy in public
rental housing. We expect that the coefficient on the interactive term for the
group with highest household income (i.e. $25,000 or more, who are threatened
with double or higher rent) to be positive, while that for the middle and lower
income groups to be smaller or even negative. Since the TPS was announced
in December 1997 and launched in January 1998, we consider two “windows”
for the home purchase decision: the five years up to the end of 1997 and the
five years from January 1998. In particular, the regressions were run against
the dependent variable of having bought a private or an HOS flat in these two
respective periods. These tests will allow us to determine if the TPS had
produced differential effects on the incentive to buy in the private/HOS flats
among the different income groups. To highlight the possible different effects
of the TPS on repeat buyers and first time homebuyers, we add age dummies, in
Model 2 and 2’, to see if the coefficients on the age dummies had changed after
the launch of the TPS and if so how. It should however be noted that all the
information was collected in September 2002. As a result the latter window is
4

See the caveat noted at the end of Section 1.
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slightly smaller than the earlier window. In addition all income and age
information reported pertain to the time of the survey, i.e., September 2002.
Empirical Results
Table 6 indicates that all of the variables were of the expected signs and
were significant. In particular, for Model 1, which did not control for age effects,
generally higher income households are more likely to buy a flat(32.8% more
likely for those with household income at HK$25000 and above than the
reference group, as compared with only 25.7% more likely for those in the
middle income range). Moreover, the relative sizes and signs of the interactive
income/tenancy status dummies are also as expected. Before TPS, high
income households who also live in public housing were about 19.2% more
likely to buy than similar income households who do not live in public housing,
indicating that the income effect dominates the substitution effect. Middle
range income households, who perceive their tenures as secure, on the other
hand, are less likely to buy if they lived in public housing.(roughly 24.7% and
38.6% less for those with monthly incomes between HK$10,000 and
HK$25000, and those with incomes below HK$10,000 respectively5)
Table 6 shows that in 1998 and beyond, the marginal probability of buying
a home apparently increased for all income categories. This might have been
due to the large decline in housing prices after 1997, which rendered homes
much more affordable. Note, however, these marginal probabilities may be
misleading in that they do not by themselves indicate the projected probabilities
of particular groups of people, which must be estimated based on the actual
characteristics of such groups. We will present these in Table 7.
Most noteworthy is the fact that from 1998, after TPS had been
implemented, richer tenants living in public rental housing became no longer
more likely to buy homes than their counterparts in the private rental housing
market. Prior to 1998, Table 6 shows that the marginal probability for “well
off public housing tenants” to buy a home, holding all other characteristics at
their mean values, stood at 19.9%. After 1997, i.e., after the announcement of
the TPS in December 1997, this marginal probability almost vanished to zero.
Again, Model 2 and 2’ in Table 6 show that, after 1997, the marginal
probability to buy for households headed by someone aged 25-29 rose
5

These marginal effects reported in Table 4 were evaluated for a household with household income
between $10000 - $25000, age of head of household at 50-59, and with other interactive variables
held at their respective means. Mathematically, they were the derivatives of the probabilities with
'

respect to a particular explanatory variable i :specifically,
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( ' )
e β αi
'
2
[1 + e( β 'α i )] β i

noticeably from 7% to 9% per cent and turned significant. This is clearly
related to the fact that home prices had dropped so much so that buying a home
became within reach of such young households. There is anecdotal evidence,
frequently reported in newspapers, that developers were selling an increasing
percentage of their new flats to first time buyers.
In contrast, those aged 40-49 who used to be 21.6% (marginal probability,
Model 2, Table 6) more likely than those in their 50’s to buy lost their
differential incentive(3.7%, Model 2’, and no longer significant). The
Chi-square statistics, which test whether a model as a whole predicts occurrence
better than chance (testing of the joint significant of all i), are all highly
significant. This suggests that older buyers, who were more likely to be repeat
buyers, suddenly became inactive. This is consistent with the suggestion that
the loss of buyers willing to pay a good price for existing homes had effectively
“incapacitated” their trading up. The introduction of the Tenants Purchase
Scheme not only meant a decline in the number of buyers in the HOS and
private homes market, but also had caused a dramatic decline in transactions
volumes. For the first time in all the history of the HOS since 1978, 1998
recorded thousands of cases where committed buyers of new HOS units(who
were chosen by a lottery mechanism) forfeited their down-payments. The
over-subscription rate dwindled. Even though most of the supply was
nevertheless absorbed, prices had to be cut. In the earlier years those potential
buyers from among the public housing who failed to get a place in the HOS
lottery would spill over to the second hand HOS market and the private market.
Now this stream of buyers either completely lost interest or were willing to pay
only much lower prices. With some 218,000 HOS owners suddenly finding
that their units lost a major source of buyers, homeowners who had depended
on them to buy their units found difficulty trading up to better homes in the
private housing market. Transactions in the existing home market plunged, in
turn freezing transactions in the new homes market, which in the earlier years
almost exclusively depended on buyers trading up (see Table 6).
Table 7 presents the simulated probabilities of a home purchase for public
housing tenants and private housing tenants whose heads of households were
aged 30 to 39. It shows that the probability of a private or HOS flat purchase
for public housing tenants within 5 years before 1998 was over 84% for those
with a monthly household income at $25,000 or more. This compares with the
66.6% probability for tenants of private flats. After 1998, the probability of
buying a private or HOS flat for public housing tenants in this income bracket
fell to 66%.
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In contrast, tenants in private flats with similar incomes and in the same age
group saw only a marginal decline in the probability of home purchase. This
revelation, combined with the evidence of strong purchasing power of green
form applicants prior to 1998, who were paying top prices for HOS units sold in
the secondary market (Table 3), supports the theory that the Tenants Purchase
Scheme has played an important role in reducing the interest of the richer
public housing tenants to buy private homes and hence in the reversal of the
housing market in 1998. As Table 8 indicates, coinciding with the
announcement of the TPS on December 8 1997, housing transactions
plummeted in December 1997.
The next section will provide evidence, using time series techniques, that
housing prices is an important driver of housing transaction volume, which will
provide further evidence about the “down-payment effect” or “equity effect”6
on home purchases.

6

“Equity effect” is a more general term that refers to the greater readiness of households to trade
up the housing ladder as the equity in their homes rises. It is more general because even if no
down payment is needed, an increase in the equity of a home is still expected to raise the propensity
to trade up.
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Table 6. Logistic Regression Estimates of Ownership of Private Residential Flats
Pre-Dec.31 1997 5 Yr. Window
Model 1
Variables

Coefficient

Constant

-1.168***

Standard
error

Post-Dec.31 1997 5 Yr. Window
Model 2

Marginal
effect

0.306

-

Coefficient
-1.546***

Standard
error

Model 1’
Marginal
effect

0.326

-

Model 2’

Coefficient

Standard
error

Marginal
effect

-2.197***

0.471

-

Coefficient

Standard
error

Marginal
effect

-2.343***

0.480

-

Household Income
<$10,000 (ref. group)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

$10,000 - $25,000

1.281***

0.363

0.257

0.757**

0.381

0.149

1.949***

0.518

0.289

1.690***

0.526

0.249

$25,000 or above

1.631***

0.368

0.328

1.087***

0.386

0.214

2.628***

0.514

0.390

2.310***

0.526

0.340

Not available*

0.654**

0.340

0.131

0.343

0.352

0.067

1.443***

0.496

0.214

1.346***

0.499

0.198

<$10,000 X PHT

-1.920***

0.417

-0.386

-2.085***

0.426

-0.410

-1.259***

0.570

-0.187

-1.286**

0.573

-0.189

$10,000-25,000 X RRH

-1.232***

0.240

-0.247

-1.195***

0.245

-0.235

-1.110***

0.256

-0.165

-1.040***

0.259

-0.153

0.957***

0.291

0.192

1.010***

0.297

0.199

0.039

0.298

0.006

0.053

0.301

0.008

25 – 29

-

-

-

0.358

0.316

0.070

-

-

-

0.607**

0.282

0.089

30 – 39

-

-

-

1.149***

0.213

0.226

-

-

-

0.642***

0.213

0.095

40 – 49

-

-

-

1.098***

0.208

0.216

-

-

-

0.251

0.215

0.037

50 or above (ref. group)

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Not available*

-

-

-

0.756

0.555

0.149

-

-

-

Interactive Dummy

> $25,000 X PHT
Age

Chi-square
Observation (n)

-0.856

0.807

261.23 (df=6)***

397.45 (df=10)***

357.28 (df=6)***

274.85 (df=10)***

1181

1181

1161

1161

-0.126

Note: (1) ** & *** denote significance at 5% and 1% respectively. 2) The sample size is smaller than is shown in Table 4 because (a) there are missing values, ( b) only flat owners who bought their flats within
the 5 year window before 1998 (1993-1997) or within the 5 year window after December 1997 were included in the analysis,( c) owners were divided into two groups – before and after 1998 d) those owners who
forgot which year(s) that they bought their flat(s) were treated as missing values.
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Table 7. Estimated Probability of Ownership of Private Residential Flats for Household
Head aged at 30-39
Prob. of Purchase in preDec.31 1997 5 Yr. Window

Prob. of Purchase in post
Dec.31 1997 5 Yr. Window

PHT = 1
PHT=0
Ratio
PHT = 1
PHT=0
Ratio
<$10,000
0.0771
0.4020
0.19
0.0480
0.1543
0.31
$10,000 - $25,000
0.3026
0.5890
0.51
0.2590
0.4973
0.52
$25,000 or above
0.8455
0.6660
1.27
0.6597
0.6477
1.02
Notes: PHT=1 implies household is public housing tenant; PHT=0 implies household is
private tenant.
Table 8. Monthly Transactions of Private Homes
First Hand
Monthly
Year/Month
Homes
Changes (%)
97/07
2,147
97/08
2,044
-4.8
97/09
1,396
-31.7
97/10
2,174
55.73
97/11
1,343
-38.22
97/12
364
-72.9
98/01
2,334
541.21
98/02
868
-62.81
98/03
2,636
203.69
98/04
649
-75.38
98/05
2,429
274.27
98/06
3,871
59.37
98/07
1,880
-51.43
98/08
2,603
38.46
98/09
824
-68.34
98/10
3,724
351.94
98/11
6,203
66.57
98/12
3,578
-42.32
99/01
1,999
-44.13
99/02
1,951
-2.4
99/03
2,589
32.7
99/04
3,507
35.46
99/05
4,173
18.99
99/06
1,516
-63.67
99/07
1,394
-8.05
99/08
777
-44.26
99/09
568
-26.90
99/10
1,400
146.48
99/11
661
-52.79
99/12
1,022
54.61
Source: Centaline Property Agency Ltd.
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Second Hand
Homes
17,227
8,595
7,800
8,315
8,653
3,804
3,598
2,883
5,501
4,683
4,364
3,413
3,337
3,427
3,303
2,681
4,974
5,946
5,012
3,268
3,640
4,313
5,063
4,517
4,317
3,871
3,072
2,797
3,422
3,273

Monthly
Changes (%)
-50.11
-9.25
6.60
4.06
-56.04
-5.42
-19.87
90.81
-14.87
-6.81
-21.79
-2.23
270
-3.62
-18.83
85.53
19.54
-15.71
-34.80
11.38
18.49
17.39
-10.78
-4.43
-10.33
-20.64
-8.95
22.35
-4.35

4. Impact of Property Price on Second Hand Transactions Volume
In this Section, we present the results of a causality test between the
property price (LnPPI) and second hand home transactions volume
(LnSTran). We first test the stationarity properties of the variables (LnPPI
and LnSTran) by using the ADF test. The results are presented in Table 9
which indicate that both are I(1) variables. This shows that the Johansen
procedure is appropriate for testing long run relation between these two
variables. Table 10 shows that they are indeed cointegrated. With the
long-run coefficient for the LnSTran positive and significant (see Table 11),
an increase in property prices will boost the second hand transactions
volume. We use the long-run cointegrating equation to generate the error
correction term to be used in the causality test equations. Two regressions
are to be run:
p −1

∆LnSTran = η + ∑ α ∆LnSTran
'

t

i

i =1

p −1

∆LnPPI = η + ∑ α ∆LnPPI
t

i =1

p −1

'

i

t −i

+∑β
j =1

p −1

t −i

+∑β
j =1

'

j

j

∆LnPPI

∆LnSTran

t− j

t− j

+θ

+θ

'

ECM

ECM

t −1

t −1

+γ '
tt

+γ

t

------- [3]
------- [4]

where ECM is the lagged error term obtained from the cointegrating
equation between LnPPI and LnSTran. Short-run Granger causality from
LnPPI to LnSTran will be demonstrated if the coefficients of the lagged
independent variables are found to be jointly significantly different from
zero (Ho: β1+β2+β3+…. = 0 -- based on the F-statistic). Long-run
Granger causality from LnPPI to LnSTran will be demonstrated if the
coefficient on the lagged ECM term is negative and statistically significant
(Ho: θ= 0 -- based on the t-statistic). The second channel of causation
represents the adjustment of the dependent variable to its long-run value.
Table 9. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of Unit Root
Variable name
Test on
No Trend
Trend
Conclusion
LnPPI
Level
-1.2264
-2.8597
I(1)
st
1 diff
-5.6593***
-5.6401***
LnSTran
Level
-1.9880
-2.4257
I(1)
1st diff
-13.1256***
-13.0912***
LnFTran
Level
-8.9940***
-8.9949***
I(0)
Notes: (1) The optimal lag in ADF test is determined by the Akaike Information Criterion. (2)
95% CV for the ADF statistic with trend and without trend are 2.8903 and -3.4548
respectively (3) *** indicates significance at 1% level.
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Table 10. Testing Cointegration between LnPPI and LnSTran
Null Hypothesis
Alternative Hypothesis
Test Statistics
Trace tests:
Trace Value
r=0
r>0
50.51***
r≦ 1
r>1
2.03

5% Critical Value
17.86
8.07

λ max tests:
λ max Value
r=0
r=1
48.49***
14.88
r=1
r=2
2.03
8.07
Notes: (1) the lag length of the VAR (=3) is determined by Akaike’s Information Criterion
(2).*** denotes significance at 1% level and r indicates the number of cointegrating vectors.
(3) As individual series clearly exhibits trending pattern, we consider regressions with
unrestricted constant.
Table 11. Estimated Long-Run Coefficients Using Johansen Cointegration
Regressors

Coefficient (t-ratio)

Intercept

3.8619

LnPPI

1.0212 (-1.7665)*

* denotes 1% and 10% significance level respectively.
Table 12. Causality Tests between LnSTran and LnPPI using the VECM Approach
Ho: LnPPI does not cause LnTran
Σβi = 0 : F-stat
Coefficient
(p-value)

5.9117
(0.000)***

θ= 0 : t-stat
-0.5692
(0.000)***

Ho: LnTran does not cause LnPPI
Σβi = 0 : F-stat
-0.0040
(0.390)

θ= 0 : t-stat
0.0437
(0.005)***

Notes: The lag length (=3) of the VAR is determined by Akaike’s Information Criterion

The results of the causality test using the VECM approach are
presented in Table 12. The ECM coefficients enter significantly both when
the LnPPI and LnSTran are treated as the dependent variable. We can
conclude that there is a bi-directional positive causal relation between the
LnSTran and LnPPI in the long run through the equilibrium mechanism.
However, the F-test showed that only those ∆LnPPI lagged dynamic terms
(in equation 1) are jointly significant. Therefore, we can conclude that
there is uni-directional causality in the short-run from LnPPI to LnSTran
through the dynamic terms but not the other way round. If TPS reduced the
interest of public housing tenants to buy a private or HOS unit, as
demonstrated in the previous section, and if this contributed to a decline in
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housing prices, the finding here lends support to the argument that TPS had
a significant negative impact on transactions volumes.
5. Conclusions
We have presented two sets of statistical results to support the thesis
that a “housing ladder effect” exists whereby an increase in equity at the
bottom of the ladder readily transmits through the housing ladder and the
second hand or existing housing market to the top, while a decline in
equity at the bottom would similarly transmit through the housing ladder
up. This result is significant as it increases our understanding about the
booms and busts of the housing market. We found that prior to the launch
of the Tenants Purchase Scheme public housing tenants who were
reasonably well off had a much higher probability of home purchase
compared to private housing tenants with similar incomes, and that they
had been paying high prices for homes in the secondary HOS market.
The purchase activities of public housing tenants certainly had played a
role in the housing market boom prior to 1998. With the launch of the
TPS the relative higher propensity to purchase for public housing tenants
disappeared. Their reduced demand for HOS and private flats again
appear to have played a part in the housing market wind-down after 1997.
The first set of statistical tests, based on data collected by the authors
in a survey at the end of 2002, represents cross-sectional analysis using the
logit regression approach. The results show a clear and interesting pattern.
The propensity to purchase always increases with household incomes, and
for high income households only, was higher among public housing tenants
than private housing tenants prior to 1998. After 1997, the propensity to
purchase fell for all households, but it fell particularly hard for the well-off
public housing tenants. Both the timing of this change and economic
theory suggest that the Tenants Purchase Scheme announced on 8
December 1997 played a role. The other set of statistical tests, based on
official published data, represent time series analysis using modern
cointegration-cum-causality test approach. It shows that housing prices
have a positive impact on second hand(existing home) transactions. This
is consistent with the theory that the housing ladder effect works through
existing homes. Because many things happen in 1997, and in particular,
the Asian Financial Crisis broke out in July of that year, it is not possible to
definitively disentangle the effects of the Asian Financial Crisis from those
of the TPS, and it is probably inappropriate to blame all the collapse of the
18

housing market in 1998 to the TPS.7 But it seems clear that the housing
ladder effect has a part to play both in the boom and in the bust of the
Hong Kong housing market. The Hong Kong story lends support to
Ortalo-Magne and Rady’s hypothesis about the “critical role of marginal
first-time buyers in housing market fluctuations,” and underscores the
symmetric effects that changes in the purchasing activities of first time
buyers may have on the entire housing market.
Table 13. Indicators of Changes of Confidence 1997:4-2000:4
Hang Seng Index
At End of Period

The US$ Premium on the HK Dollar
in the 1-Year Forward Market

2000:4

15095

-154

2000:3

15649

-142

2000:2

16156

-9

2000:1

17406

48

99:4

16962

396

99:3

12733

909

99:2

13532

959

99:1

10942

1547

98:4

10049

1512

98:3

7883

4235

98:2

8543

4201

98:I

11519

2396

97:4

10807

4036

Source: Hong Kong Monetary Authority and http://beta.finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EHSI
Negative values in the US$ premium on the HK$ in the forward market suggest an
expectation that the Hong Kong dollar would appreciate. The Table shows a clear RISE in
confidence from 1997Q4 to 1998Q1.

7

Table 13 indicates that confidence, though damaged to some extent by the Asian Financial
Crisis, had actually been restored to some extent in the first quarter of 1998, but prices and
transactions fell most dramatically in the first quarter of 1998.
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Appendix Table A1: Developments of Living Space and Living Density Standards on
Public Rental Housing
Pre-1973

Group A Estates (i.e. Government Low Cost Housing and Housing
Authority estates): The allocation standard was that the Net Living Area
(NLA) which is the net living space excluding kitchen, toilet and balcony
would not be less than 35 sq. ft. (3.25m2) per person. Children were counted
as adults or, for those under 10 years of age, to be counted as half an adult.
Group B Estates: The allocation standard was that the NLA would not
be less than 24 sq. ft. (2.23m2) per person.

Nov. 1973

The Housing Authority decided to adopt a uniform standard at 3.25m2.

1974/75 to
1981/82

The NLA would steadily increase beyond the standard of 3.25m2 per person
and reached an average of 4.43m2 per person in 1981/82.

1982

Following a review on the allocation standards, the Housing Authority
decided to raise the allocation standard to 4.0m2 per person NLA or 5.5m2
Internal Floor Area (IFA) per person.

1987

The Housing Authority further raised the allocation standard for new
lettings to provide each person with no less than 4.2m2 per person NLA or
5.5m2 per person IFA.

1991

Following a review, the Housing Authority approved in September 1991 the
dual allocation standard; i.e. all tenants would be given a choice of two
allocation standards with two correspondingly different Median
Rent-Income Ratio (MRIR) limits. Hence, a tenant could choose between
the allocation standard of 5.5m2 per person IFA with rent set at the MRIR
limit of 15% or a new standard of 7m2 per person IFA with MRIR limit at
18.5%.

1992

After reviewing the dual allocation standards, the Housing Authority
decided that the allocation standards of 5.5m2 per person IFA and 7m2 per
person IFA should remain unchanged.

Source: Office of the Commissioner for Administrative Complaints, Report of the
Investigation on Overcrowding Relief in Public Housing.
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Appendix Table A2: Development of Public Housing in Hong Kong
1954

Eight permanent six-storey buildings “Mark I” were completed to
resettle the victims of the 1953 Shek Kip Mei Fire.

1965

The resettlement blocks became high-rise buildings. For the first time a
balcony and a toilet were provided inside each flat in “Mark IV, V and
VI” buildings

1978 January

Home Ownership Scheme (HOS)
8373 flats were offered for sale under the Phase I of the Home
Ownership Scheme (HOS) and the Private Sector Participation Scheme
(PSPS) was introduced as a supplement to the HOS flats in the
following year giving private developers a role in developing public
housing estates.

1981 October

HOS
Land value was excluded from HOS flats prices.

1981

Middle Income Housing (MIH) scheme
The Middle Income Housing (MIH) scheme was launched to meet the
housing needs for families with income above the limit for HOS/PSPS
flats

1983

MIH
Discontinuation of the MIH scheme

1985

An “Extended Redevelopment Program” to clear sub-standard blocks
built in the 60's began.

1987 April

Housing Subsidy Income Limit Policy
The Housing Subsidy Income Limit Policy (the “double rent” policy)
was introduced with the objective of reducing housing subsidy to public
housing tenants who are no longer in need of it.

1988

Home Purchase Loan Scheme (HPLS)
Home Purchase Loan Scheme (HPLS) was introduced by the Housing
Authority (HA) to assist eligible families to purchase homes in the
private sector. The HA was reorganized to run as a statutory body and
a chairman was appointed.

1991 August

A number of public rental blocks were offered for sale to sitting tenants.
The response was very poor.

1994 June

Anti-speculation Measures
A series of measures to curb speculation were announced.

1994 August

The Sandwich Class Housing Loan Scheme was launched by the
Housing Society (HS)
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1997 June

HOS/PSPS Secondary Market Scheme was launched
Launch of the Secondary Market Scheme. It allowed owners of HOS
and PSPS flats to sell their flats to public housing tenants from the
fourth year of purchase without repaying the implicit land price subsidy
to the HA.

October

Policy Address stated the government’s intention to build at least 85 000
flats a year in the public and private sectors; to achieve a home
ownership rate of 70% in ten years; and to reduce the average waiting
time for public rental housing to three years.

December 8

Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS) announced offering up to 88% discount
from the estimated market price. Scheme was well received.

1998 January

Phase One of the Tenants Purchase Scheme with 27,000 flats in six
estates offered for sale to existing tenants began.
The Sandwich Class Housing Loan Scheme was abolished

1998 March

TPS
A further 27,000 flats in six estates were offered for sale under the TPS
Phase 2. By the end of the month, 85% of the tenants concerned had
indicated an interest in buying.

1998 February

Relaxation of the resale restriction period (HOS flats)
Relaxation of the resale restriction period under the HOS was endorsed
by the HA, with effect from June 1999, the ten year resale restriction
period has been shortened to five years, while the initial restriction
period reduced from three years to two years.

1999 March

The Mortgage Subsidy Scheme (MSS)
MSS was introduced as a pilot trial to promote home ownership among
residents affected by the Comprehensive Redevelopment and Cottage
Area Clearance Programme

1999 February

The Buy or Rent Option Scheme (BRO)
The Buy or Rent Option Scheme (BRO) was introduced to help
prospective tenants on the Waiting List for Public Rental Housing to
purchase their own homes from the outset.

1998 September HOS and Home Purchase Loan Scheme
To meet the community's aspiration for home-ownership, the Authority
opened up the HOS and HPLS to single persons.
1999 April

TPS
A further 27 400 flats in six estates were offered for sale under Tenants
Purchase Scheme Phase 3.

1999 November

Housing Production
During the year, public housing production was at an unprecedented
peak with an annual average of some 173 000 flats under construction.
A total of 48 500 domestic flats and 11 commercial centres were
completed.
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2000 January

TPS
The first batch of TPS flats, which had been sold for 2 years, became
mature for re-sale under the Secondary Market Scheme.

2000 March

HOS
In response to changes in market conditions, the HA decided to transfer
16000 HOS flats scheduled for completion between 2000/01 and
2003/04 to rental housing

2000 April

TPS
A further 26,414 flats were offered for sale under TPS Phase 4.

2000 June

Housing Production Reached New Heights
Production of homes reached new heights with the completion of 89,000
flats during this year

2001 February

HOS and PSPS
The HA endorsed the moratorium on the sale of HOS and PSPS flats for
10 months until end June 2002

2001 March

Policy to stabilize the housing market
Measures in the Statement on Housing Policy included cessation of the
production and sale of HOS, PSPS flats as well as the sale of PRH flats
under the TPS after phase 6 will cease from 2003 onwards

2001 September Home Assistance Loan Scheme
The Home Assistance Loan Scheme was launched to replace the HA’s
Home Purchase Loan Scheme and the Housing Society’s Home Start
Loan Scheme
2002 November

Suspension of the TPS and other measures
The Secretary of Housing announced that the TPS would be suspended
indefinitely with the exception of the TPS Phase 6A which had been
announced, which was being withheld pending the completion of the
condition survey on the drainage system and any necessary repair
works. He also announced a series of measures to eliminate the excess
supply of housing units, including the indefinite suspension of
production and sales of the HOS scheme beyond the already produced
units.

2003 May

Home Assistance Loan Scheme
The HA decided to close all applications for the Home Assistance Loan
Scheme with immediate effect, pending a separate review on the scheme

Sources:
1. Hong Kong Housing Authority, (various years), Annual Report, Hong Kong.
2. Yeung, Y.M. and Timothy K.Y. Wong (2003). Fifty Years of Public Housing in Hong Kong.
Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press
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